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FIVE YEARS AFTER THE CHANGES.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE
By Karoly Toth
Dr. Karoly T6th (Hungarian Reformed Church) is a minister and director of the
Ecumenical Center in Budapest. He is a former bishop in his church and was both
the general secretary and president of the Christian Peace Conference. This paper
was delivered as a lecture in Berlin in the fall of 1994. His articles appeared
previously in REE.

This paper will contain five sections. In the first some specific features of CentralEastern Europe will be pointed out; in the second part the prehistory of the changes of
regimes will be sketched; in the third part some common characteristics of the countries

co~~erned will be emphasized; in the fourth part an analysis of the most burning problems
of this region (nationalism, digesting the past, theological assessment of.the change) will be
given; finally, there will be a summary of what Central Europeans can offer to and what we
expect from Western Europe, i.e. what are the hopes for the future.
I.

I. The attempt to describe the political-social as well as ecclesiastical situation in Central:.:

Eastern Europe and to take a measure of the consequences of the radical changes commenced
five years ago can only result in a temporary picture. Five years ago there began a profound
and far-reaching process which is far from being finished. It has produced changes .that are
perceptible all over the world and the effects and challenges .of which can be of serious
consequences for Western Europe. Signs of dissatisfaction with the existing socialism could
be seen long ago, but it was five years ago that this process sped up dramatically and assumed
revolutionary characteristics. The trends and the outlines of this process were visible, but
its final effects are unpredictable.
2. Concentrating on Central-Eastern Europe in this sense, i.e. with a view of its global
consequences, we have to keep certain facts in mind.
A. Central-Eastern Europe should not be regarded as a monolithic unit in spite of many
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common characteristics of the countries in that region. The area behind the former Iron
Curtain is just as multi-colored as Western Europe. The former Soviet Union itself is very
problematical; it unquestionably belongs to Eastern Europe but by no means to Central
Europe. Central Europe has never been a monolithic unit, not even .at the time of the most
brutal Stalinism when the fiction of its unity was enforced with arms.
B. By Central-Eastern Europe we do not mean a merely geographical areas, not even a
simply cultural community, but those former socialist countries in which, five years ago, the
experiment of socialism proved a catastrophic failure. One of the peculiarities of these
countries is the conscious or unconscious conviction of their peoples that they do not belong
to the East, but, by their culture, they constitute an integral part of. Europe formed by
Western culture, as distinct from the Eastern form of Christianity (Byzantium, Orthodoxy
unaffected by the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment). Taken in this
sense, Central-Eastern Europe includes the following states: the former German Democratic
Republic, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia and on the
meeting place of the two cultures, Romania as well as the rest of successor states of the
former Yugoslavia.
C. However, the concept of Central-Eastern Europe is not clear as yet. In any case, it
is hard to draw the borders of Europe. It is obvious where it begins in the West: at the
Atlantic Ocean. But where does it end? At the Ural Mountains? At Vladivostok?
A further difficulty is the phraseology describing the Central-Eastern European processes
in a way that it should meet the requirements of the West .. This means a considerable
disadvantage for the region because in this way it appears to be unreliable, incalculable,
impenetrable, destablizing and constantly obliged to be on the defensive, especially at this
time of unemployment and economic recession in the West overrun with impoverished
refugees from the East and South.
3. I am speaking on the basis of my experiences in Hungary, although I endeavor to stress
traits characteristic for the whole of Central Europe. I can do so all the more because my
country--as is well known--has and still is a precursor of the reforms .in Central-Eastern
Europe.
II.

1. The change in region did not occur without any previous indications but had been
preceded by a long period of preparation. Soon after the ideological and economic division
of European fissures could be seen on the wall of the socialist camp. I refer to events in
chronological order: the uprising of workers in Berlin in June, 1953, the events in Poznan,
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Poland, in 1956, soon after the revolution in Hungary, then the Prague Spring in 1968, and
since the beginning of the 1980s, repeated unrests in Poland.
2. We have to say clearly that the reforms in the socialist countries were introduced by
Communists who had previously believed in the reformability of socialism (e.g. lmre Nagy
in Budapest, Alexander Dubcek in Prague, and later Mikhail Gorbachev ·in Moscow).
However, since the beginning of the 1980s the hopelessness of reforming socialism, hallmarked by the Soviet Union, became more and more apparent. The way to its demolition
was opened by Gorbachev's policy of perestroika which gave up its claim to hegemony in
Central-Eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, this was the decision that revealed the
prospects for the reformatory efforts and made the dismantling of the Communist power
structure possible.
3. The forces that engaged in pulling down the then existing socialism at the end of the
1980s represented a very broad spectrum from the reform-Communists through intellectuals
and liberals to various groups. This meant the collaboration of people with very different
views all of whom wanted change and were against dictatorship but had no· precise program
for the future. Nevertheless, there were two varieties of this trend which worked against the
ideology of the atheism and internationalism: religion and nationalism. Both were used as
natural weapons against dictatorship which tried to oppress these two big entities. These
characteristics of the change in its early period will perhaps explain the contradictions to be
experienced later on in Central-Eastern Europe to which we shall return later.
4. The events of the change in 1989-90 cannot be regarded as revolutionary ones in the
classic sense of the nineteenth and twentieth century revolutions. That is why Timothy
Garston Ash, the well-known English political scientist, coined the word "refolution," the
mixture of reform and revolution, for the events in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.
These events were not directly influenced by the institutional churches. Their influence was
rather indirect, e.g. in the G.D.R. and Poland and through certain individuals. e.g. Rev.
Laszlo TOkes in Romania. And yet the churches were those exceptional organizations which-in spite of their negation of Marxism by their existence--were tolerated. Whether, in this
case, the church can be regarded as a factor of resistance remains a question.
Ill.

I. In order to correctly weigh the consequences of changes in Central-Eastern Europe,
we must make a few short excursions. We have to remind ourselves of the fact that the
nations of this region were, for four hundred years, under the yoke of foreign dominion.
Until the end of World War I the Hapsburgs ruled in the West; the East was dominated or
menaced by the huge empire of the Tsars, while the South was in the hands of the gradually
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weakening Ottoman Empire. The collapse of these powers at the end of World War I did not
bring freedom to the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe because in a few years two great
ideologies announced their claims: in the West, German Nazism with its anti-rationalism and
in the East, Stalin's socialist hyper-rationalism. Thus •. Central-Eastern Europe became the
exercise-field of these ideologies; that had devastating consequences.
2. By the last decade of the twentieth century, both of these giants disappeared. A new
era could begin: a period of real national sovereignty. The nations living here could, in spite
of their problems, breathe freely. Many people ask how long will this kairos last. It follows
from the above that the nations of Central-Eastern Europe know full well that their fate
depends--owing to the interdependence of political incidents--to great measure on the
development of world politics. They are aware of their inability to influence their future in
a decisive way because they are but subordinate pawns on the big chess board of world
politics. Perhaps that is why they are so persistently trying to join European organizations
at all levels (NATO, European Community, etc.). They hope to find security within the
community of the nations of Europe. And they are greatly disappointed by their failure to
be permitted to join these organizations so far.
3. Beside these endeavors of theirs are three basic decisions adopted by all nations of the
region.
A. They all want to build institutions of a pluralist society, of parliamentary democracy.
All nations of Central-Eastern Europe have declared themselves for the democratic standards
of a pluralist system of institutions, though they (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) have
no traditions in this field. This circumstance led, in the past five years, to a hectic search
for a new identity, an effort characterized sometimes by quite anachronistic systems as, e.g.,
the rehabilitation of certain shady persons of their past (the re-burial of Regent Horthy in
Hungary, the Tisso-cult in Slovakia, etc.).
We must not think, however, that the search for ideals in the past is to be condemned in
any case; it is objectionable only if history is used to restore the past that God had closed
already, instead of trying to understand thereby what God expects from us here and now.
This anachronistic search for identity or its

~ejection

respectively is one of the reasons why

the reform Communists .have become popular again, as demonstrated, e.g., by the recent

...

elections in Hungary.
B. The countries of Central-Eastern Europe have all opted for market economies. In this
respect, too, they had some illusions. After the failure of planned economy, they were

;

convinced that its opposite would surely work. But capitalism viewed from afar is very
different from what is experienced at close range. Here some naivety also played a part.
Those living for forty long years under socialism were unable to comprehend this quite
different mechanism, the interaction between politics and economy in capitalism.
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In

socialism, a political decision was at the same time an economic one too, but in market
economy, their relation to each other is much more complicated and indirect. Thus, when
Western politicians promised some economic aid, a financial assistance, people brought up
in socialism were astonished at the absence of its immediate effects.
4. Market economy was for Central-Eastern Europeans either an abstract concept or an
attractive quantity of luxurious products unattainable in socialism. But they did not realize
what had made this abundance of goods possible: the hard work and the rational organization
of production. It will surely take a long time till the working morale and the mentality of
the people brought up in socialism can be adapted to the rules of market economy.
In the last five years it has appeared that there are two kinds of capitalists: the hardworking, thrifty, and enterprising type, and the loathsome, unscrupulous, fraudulent
impostors.

It has also become obvious that competition in market economy is just as

relentless a struggle as the class-struggle was.

All these are among the reasons of the

disappointment and nostalgia that characterize the political mood in Central-Eastern Europe
nowadays.

A third decision has also been made

by all nations in Central-Eastern Europe: the observance of human rights (religious liberty
and other liberties included) and the condemnation of all kinds of discrimination. This
principle seems to be contradicted by conflicts and tensions which have arisen in the last five
years (xenophobia, nationalism, anti-semitism); especially ticklish are the relations between
those in power and the representatives of the mass media. And yet we can say with a good
conscience that the institutions established to insure human rights are functioning well and
without any major frictions.

5. Here we have to deal with the question why the neo-Communists have come to power
again in some countries in Central-Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Poland and most recently in
Hungary). The mass media are fomenting a certain kind of panic in Western Europe, as if
"the spirit of the allegedly dead Communism had come back." 1 But we have to state that:
A. these Communists are not identical with those of fifty years ago;
B. this new generation of Communists played a key role in the reform movement;
C. the successors of their former Communists are persistently emphasizing "their
adherence to democratic norms, the observance of parliamentary democracy and market
economy," as was stated with relief by the Neue Zurcher Zeitung. One need not be afraid
of these socialists as they call themselves, because "their power is considerably limited by the

1

Cf. the lead article of the Neue Zurcher Zeitung on May 21-22, 1994,"Ghosts in Eastern
Europe."
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barriers of democratic institutions and the narrow elbow-room of economy." 2 These freely
elected leftist governments are dependent on the goodwill of Western Europe.·
In this connection one of the defects of the governments elected in 1990 should be
pointed out, namely, that their search for a new identity was predominantly of ideological
character. This orientation frightened the peoples of Central-Eastern Europe who had been
tired of all ideologies and wanted to think and act pragmatically at last.
IV.
Three delicate questions need to be dealt with.
1. The first is the harrowing question of the national and ethnic conflicts that have
broken out in these last five years. This is a very complicated problem evoked by various
causes. Nationalism is namely a conglomerate of very different emotions, ideas, and views,
resulting in tragic incidents which are bewildering not only in Western Europe butthe whole
world.

One of its components is surely the centuries-long oppression which has badly

injured the national feelings of these peoples.

Thus, it is understandable that their

nationalism has erupted like a volcano in their newly acquired freedom. Nationalism proved
an effective weapon in the fight against socialism~ but after its victory it has become like an
evil spirit that escaped out of a bottle. Its force has only increased by the fact that it was
also resorted to by Communist dictatorships when they felt their nations' growing alienation
from socialism. An extreme example was given by Nicolae Ceaucescu who combined his
brutal dictatorship with a fanatic nationalism. Unfortunately, further instances could also
be provided.
It should be realized that nationalism consists basically of two components. Experts call

it a "binary ideology" which has a negative-destructive and, at the same time, a positiveconstructive side. It depends on the concrete circumstances, which of the two prevails. And
it is often· forgotten that, in the nineteenth century which is considered the starting period
of modern nationalism, there was in Europe another tradition which, already then tried to
overcome nationalism in the name of Christian universalism. Novalis, e.g., wrote a work
published in I 799 (Christianity of Europe) about the "formidable madness besetting the
nations."
The ethnic conflicts and the problem of nationalism have raised a very difficult, almost
unsolvable, dilemma for the churches of Central-Eastern Europe. It can be felt especially
in the case of minority churches and ethnic groups but can also be observed in great churches
living in areas afflicted by civil wars (in the former Yugoslavia and in the successor states
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of the Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Georgia). The churches' dilemma is that they have to
decide whether they will take upon themselves to become the instruments of fanatic
nationalism, further deepening thereby the conflicts, or try, in the spirit of the Gospel of
Jesus Christ, that they will be accused of unpatriotism and rejected by the. (anatically
nationalistic ethnic groups.
But we Christians should never get tired of emphasizing that Christian theology makes
no qualitative distinction among nations. The differences between them are contextual:
geographical, historical, and cultural differences which, from Christian point of view, are
only of relative significance. That means the churches' point of view in judging a nation
must always be a theological one. We always have to make a distinction between political
objectives, programs, and sentiments from a theological angle. Nationality should not be a
Christian attribute of a church. The national character only indicates the place where a
certain member of the Church Universal lives and bears witness to his or her Lord. In other
words, nationalism must always remain a cultural category; it must never serve political ends;
it should only express the specific mentality of a nation enriching thereby the many colored
spirituality of the world community. Practically speaking many people live in national (and
denominational) churches; national episcopal conferences have of late gained more and more
importance in the Roman Catholic Church too. Commitment to one's own nation can .enrich
the churches. On the other hand, nowadays we have every reason tobe afraid of nationalism.
It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the church is the one people of God made of all the

nations. But our contribution to overcoming a dangerous nationalism unworthy of any credit
should not be some new sort of internationalism, rather a creative reciprocity which discovers
the spiritual treasures of the sister churches.
There is an important lesson to be learned by the nations of Central-Eastern Europe from
those of the West. Western economy is due, among other things, to the change of thinking
there after World War II. Those nations (e.g. the Germans and the French) were able to
abandon their traditional hostilities and to cooperate in reconciliation. In this historic process
we do not have to do with the denial of their national identity, but with such a radical
change of mentality whereby they no longer regard their nationality as a weapon against
other nations. The nations of Central-Eastern Europe have, however, used their newly-won
liberty after the collapse of the Communist system for redressing their old historic
grievances. Thus, their freedom is turned, in a persuasive way, against one another.
Now, there are two political trends prevalent in Central-Eastern Europe: intolerant
nationalism on the one hand, and the endeavor to bring about reconciliation among nation
(in the name of European civilization) on the other.

The latter considers the national

character culturally and does not use it as a political weapon. If the nations of CentralEastern Europe want to join the European community, they have to realize that they, too,
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must be reconciled with one another. "If they are unable to do so, they automatically exclude
themselves from Europe," says W. Plaff, a distinguished American journalist. 3
2. Another very complicated problem engrossing public opinion in Central-Eastern
Europe during the five years since the change of regimes is how to assess their recent past.
A. On the one hand, there was no open or official, and even less scientific program
which could honestly deal with this question after the past forty-five years. Instead, the
change was accompanied by the usual confusion arising in the wake of all political turnovers and agitated by turbulent emotions.

On the other hand, the decidedly peaceful

character of the change evoked a strong clash of emotions in which hatred, wrath, revenge,
the desire of retaliation were mixed. This very poisonous amalgam

can hardly be described

objectively, but it surely has serious warning signs in it.
B. There are some for whom the change has proved an excellent opportunity to realize
their personal and egotistic ambitions. At once we were inundated with "oppressed and
persecuted" people who announced their claims to amends. At the same time we also have
to say that the real victims of the overthrown regime behaved modestly and generally
dispensed with any reparation. Most of ·them were even ousted from publicity. A certain
kind of scapegoat reflex got the mastery of the population, but it could be considered one
form of conscious or subconscious sense of guilt as well as a wish of purification. In this
connection the right word was said by President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia: "Somehow
or other we were all involved in the functioning of that system."
C. The specific character of the change was also determined by a symptom which might
have its origin in the history of the region. This is the psychological effect of frequent
changes in the political situation. In the present century alone, political systems alone have
so often changed in Central-Eastern Europe as nowhere else in Western Europe. This has
produced a type of person, the cynical opportunist, who, for the sake of mere survival, can
and will adapt himself to the most contrary circumstances. A collective expression of this
behavior is: "We shall worship tomorrow what we burn today, and what we adore today we
shall burn tomorrow." It will take a long time to overcome this moral distortion.
3. The churches have experienced the change in the policy of the state with regard to
them as a miracle.

While for forty years they lived (to say the least) under unfriendly

gover.nments, they were surprised to find that the freely elected government felt itself bound
to rehabilitate and compensate the churches.
A. It is, however, not quite clear what the churches really want: restoration of the former

.·

situation (the status quo ante) or renewal on the basis of serious theological reflections .
Would they return to the system of the people's church ("Volkskirche") and to continue where

3

"East Europeans Have an Adjustment to Make" International Herald Tribune, May 21-22, 1994.
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they left off forty-five years ago, or do they wish to build up something new? At some
places there is the temptation of the vision of the corpus Christianum or even of the idea of
Neo-Constantinianism. But the churches had soon to realize that the restitution of their
former institutions did not mean that they could win back their alienated believers. (In
Hungary, the government elected after the change of regime, regulated in law, the restitution
of former ecclesiastical institutions. Church schools, e.g., must be returned to the church
within ten years. In other countries other rules are in force.) Through these institutions, the
churches can reach a great nun:tber of people who are not regular church-goers.

And

churches are also given considerable financial aid in order that they can make these
institutions function. This, however, raises another problem. The newly opened possibilities
require so much of the churches' energies that they will overlook their real task: the
preaching of God's Word and the pastoral care of their believers.
B. The great historical churches also have to take notice of the fact that, within a pluralist
society, they are just one group among many others, and that they cannot live by their
privileges in the long run; they must. rely on the faith of their members, as at the time of
socialism. They have to take notice of the circumstance that faith is no longer supported by
a general consensus. Furthermore, the appearance and spread of various sects and new
religions constitute a great challenge for the churches of Central-Eastern Europe.

The

interest in religion has considerably grown in this region, but a great many people are drawn
to new religious experiments, and this can result in decreasing of churchliness. This is more
so as the historic churches are, as former so called collaborators with the socialist regime,
regarded by certain groups of society with suspicion.
C. All these dangers should not be made light of. For the reasons enumerated above, the
churches...,-like the Biblical Martha --"are careful and troubled about many things" which can
all be necessary indeed. They should not forget, however, the anum necessarium, the "one
needful thing" (Luke I0, 42), the essential thing, namely that they are ordained to be the
shepherds and prophets of their people and that they must under all circumstances be
engaged in performing the duty arising from that obligation. One of the greatest challenges
the churches are faced with today is where they are able to avoid such triumphalism that
would alienate people from them even more.
D. The theological dealing with the changes--if there is such an engagement at all--is
very one-sided. The past is summarily disowned and rejected without any analysis and can
unequivocally be regarded as opportunism. It is high time that we should give a theological
answer to our past. But this should be done as a real task of theology and not simply as an
opportunistic antithesis of all theological reflections that were considered "official theology"
in the forty years of socialism. It would be a great mistake to replace the quasi theological
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thinking of yesterday with another "quasi theology" of today. We should avoid any new
manipulation with theological values.

v.
Having sketched above a general picture of Central-Eastern Europe, let us now try to
weigh the situation and to sum up our findings.·
I. One might have the impression 'that there are contrary trends in the Central-Eastern

and Western part of Europe: an increasing integration in the West and the multiplying signs
of disintegration in Mid-East. The stages of West-European integration are well known
(Common Market, Maastricht Agreement, European Community, all leading to European
Union).
2. At the same time, the symptoms of disintegration, of separation are multiplying in
Eastern Europe. Here we have to do not only with the former federal states (Yugoslavia,
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia) falling apart but also with the tragic civil wars which further
parcel up the successor states. Another question raised by the most recent events with special
sharpness is whether the gulf between Western and Eastern Europe will not be deepened by
the fact that, while in Western Europe the conservative forces get into power. In Eastern
Europe the neo-Communists have won in the elections, offering some sort of post-socialism
as a consolation to the disappointed and impoverished population of the region. A further
unhappy feature of the situation in Central-Eastern Europe is that its nations are not getting
closer to one another; they are not endeavouring to have a better knowledge of one another's
language and culture; they are rather competing for the favor of Western Europe.
3. The churches of Central-Eastern Europe can, in spite of all their problems and
difficulties, make an important contribution to the development of the European Community.
It would be worthwhile to examine how the Christians of the region could withstand militant
atheism and survive socialism. Their experiences prove that real strength does not consist in
great institutions and that the church can only be saved by God's grace and the faith of her
members. This does not mean that the church has no need of institutions. But we have
understood what is the "power in infirmities" (II Cor. 12:9). How could the churches of
Central-Eastern Europe bear witness of their experience to the rest of Europe in a way that
it should not look like hubris or presumption? There are namely some who think that the
impulse for ecclesiastical renewal in Europe can be expected from the Eastern part of the
continent where the churches were purified in the fire of persecutions. Those who are of
this opinion emphasize the importance of one's personal commitment in faith without which
no revival is possible. In order that our churches can impart these experiences to other
European churches, they should first refle_ct on them together in an ecumenical spirit.

35

The churches of Central-Eastern Europe have also learned how to appreciate
ecumenical solidarity. The fact that they could always feel to be an integral part of the
Church Universal meant a great encouragement to them. not mention the considerable aid
they were given in so many ways by the churches of Western Europe and North America.
4. It will take a long time until the nations of Central-Eastern Europe acquire the
working morale necessary for market economy and the technology of the organization of
work. They should learn these things as soon as possible. On the other hand. Europe need
not be afraid of the recent events in Central-Eastern Europe. e.g .• the result of the elections
in Hungary. I am convinced that socialism of the Stalinist type will never return. but a
productive society that is also mindful of justice will by and by be crystallized.

S. In conclusion. we must learn ecumenism together. in a way that we should never
forget: Europe is for us. Christians. too big and too small at the same time. Too small.
because the Christians• home is the Oikoumene. the whole inhabited world and not merely
the European house. Too big. because it is the local congregation. our community of faith.
and not the bureaucratic organizations. where Christian faith can become reality. The ethics
of co-existence must be jointly formed by all nations and churches of Europe. and it must
be based on the best traditions of the continent. But this can only be accomplished it we
jointly get over nationalism and denominationalism which are likewise European traditions.
In such a way can the churches of East and West. North and South, and. of course. of
Central-Eastern Europe as well. be the actual makers of the All-European community.
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